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Abstract 
 
Governance architectures are strategic and long-term institutional 
arrangements of international organisations exhibiting three features, 
namely, they address strategic and long-term problems in a holistic 
manner, they set substantive output-oriented goals, and they are 
implemented through combinations of old and new organizational 
structures within the international organisation in question. The Lisbon 
Strategy is the most high-profile initiative of the European Union for 
economic governance of the last decade. Yet it is also one of the most 
neglected subjects of EU studies, probably because not being identified as 
an object of study on its own right. We define the Lisbon strategy as a case 
of governance architecture, raising questions about its creation, evolution, 
and impact at the national level. We tackle these questions by drawing on 
institutional theories about emergence and change of institutional 
arrangements and on the multiple streams model. We formulate a set of 
propositions and hypotheses to make sense of the creation, evolution and 
national impact of the Lisbon Strategy. We argue that institutional 
ambiguity is used strategically by coalitions at the EU and national level in 
(re-)defining its ideational and organisational elements.  
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1. Introduction  
 
During the past decade or so, several international organizations have launched ambitious 
strategies putting forward long-term goals like the reduction of poverty, social-economic 
development, or improving competitiveness. Perhaps some of the most emblematic examples 
of such strategies are to be found in the UN-system, like the “Millennium Development 
Goals” 2000-2015 (Akiyama 2005); the “Global Compact” of 2000 (Ruggie 2001; Thérien 
and Pouliot 2006); or the “Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme” processes of the IMF and 
the World Bank since 1999 (Vetterlein 2007). Common to all these strategies is their long-
term, highly political, and holistic approaches to cross-cutting international policy problems. 
Common to them is also a strong emphasis on output-oriented goals as signalling devices, 
and the re-design of existing organizational structures for its implementation. It is therefore 
advisable to separate the analysis of these initiatives from the appraisal of their achievements 
(or lack thereof). In this paper, we are concerned with the analytics of this phenomenon as 
such, whilst most of the current debate, especially on the Lisbon Strategy of the European 
Union (EU), deals with the results of the agenda and its current re-launch as “Europe 
2020”(Commission 2010a; 2010b). 
 
In essence, the effort to provide global coordination has led several international 
organisations to engage with encompassing lines of action agreed in various combinations of 
formal and, sometimes, participatory decision-making fora. These lines are typically 
implemented through targets and indicators that guide voluntary or conditioned action1
                                                 
1 Some of them might have elements of conditionality if funding is related, like in the PRSP of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
. The 
ultimate objective of this international governance by blueprints is to generate coordinated 
action that addresses simultaneously multiple dimensions of collective and typically 
convoluted long-term problems. In the European Union, the Single European Market project 
1985-92, the Economic and Monetary Union, and the Lisbon Strategy are the ultimate 
examples of such long term action-oriented strategies for economic growth, sharing several 
central traits with the UN examples above. However, in the fields of international 
organization and EU studies alike, these strategies have received relatively scarce scholarly 
attention. Heated debates about the implications of these strategies in terms of their 
(in)effective results, have tended to obscure a more profound and crucial set of analytical 
questions related to the nature of these new phenomena, their origin, their changing dynamics 
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in time, and their structural effects on the ideational and organizational dimensions of 
governance within international organisations. Although the toolbox of social scientists 
already contains a panoply of concepts, the nature of the 'beast' is different this time.  
 
“Governance architectures” are strategic and long-term political initiatives of international 
organisations on cross-cutting policy issues locked in commitments about targets and 
processes. They are specific forms of institutional arrangements, characterized by three main 
features, namely, they address complex problems in a strategic, holistic long-term 
perspective; they set substantive output-oriented goals, and they are implemented through 
combinations of old and new organizational structures within the international organisation in 
question. They often entail a renewed approach to the raison d’être of the international 
organisation in question, with symbolic, normative and structural implications. Constellations 
of actors involved in the creation of a governance architecture engage in strategic and 
discursive interaction with the aim of defining a collective frame of reference for their action 
– a référentiel (Muller 1995)). 
 
The definition of “governance architectures” as an object of study offers the opportunity to 
employ already established theoretically-based tool boxes to explain the phenomenon, its 
(changing) nature and its impact of international and European politics. It is important to 
reiterate that we do not pre-assign any specific properties regarding the governance 
architectures’ internal coherence, effectiveness or efficiency. Some architectures might be 
more coherent, effective, and/or efficient than others. These are empirical questions (see 
section 3). 
 
Since in this collection we are concerned with the Lisbon Strategy, a few remarks on what 
this particular case of governance architecture is are in order. The Lisbon Strategy for growth 
and jobs is perhaps the most high-profile initiative of the European Union (EU) in the first 
decade of the 2000s (Rodrigues 2003; Begg 2007), and one of the most prominent cases of 
“governance architectures” in EU politics. Launched in March 2000, its original goals 
covered competitiveness, employment and social cohesion, whereas the goal of becoming 
‘world leader in sustainable development’ was added by the Gothenburg summit of June 
2001. The catch-all goal, however, is competitiveness, a contested, wide and dynamic notion 
particularly from the point of view of policy-making (Hay 2007). In terms of governance, the 
strategy was set to encompass both policy areas where the institutions of the EU have treaty 
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competence and others where the classic Community method cannot be used or is politically 
unacceptable. This attempt to make use of novel modes of governance contained an element 
of coordination and policy exchange between member states through the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) (Tholoniat 2010).  
In response to the mid-term review critical standpoint that the strategy was not 
achieving its goals (High level group 2004) the Lisbon Strategy was re-launched by the 
Barroso Commission in 2005 with a new focus on securing ‘more and better jobs’ in Europe: 
the ‘Growth and Jobs’ agenda. Most important in the 2005 re-launch was the re-organisation 
of the procedure into three major steps, namely , the definition of a set of European Integrated 
Guidelines, their implementation through 3-year national reform programs, and the 
monitoring of progress on a country by country basis and collectively. These procedural 
changes meant a significant re-definition of the roles of the Commission, the Council and 
member states (Borrás 2009). At the same time, though, an increased number of policy fields 
at EU level were made compliant with this agenda in a complementary Community Lisbon 
Programme. Policy areas such as regulatory reform and corporate taxation were ’Lisbonised’, 
adding to the overall goal of ‘competitiveness’ and expanding the reach of this strategy.  
Ten years after its creation, however, the evaluation of the Lisbon Strategy’s 
impact on the economy and on national reform processes is not straightforward (Commission 
2010b). Whereas it has managed to create a European consensus on reform contents, it has 
failed to deliver on several of its ambitious benchmarks and targets. The credit crunch of 
2008 and the resulting economic recession of 2009-2010 seem to have enhanced a sense of 
urgency, making the strategy even more visible politically. Furthermore, the 2009 EP 
elections and the second Barroso Commission have contributed opening this window of 
opportunity for the re-definition of the strategy. The recently approved “Europe 2020” puts 
more emphasis on innovation, green technologies and social cohesion; and it keeps the 
procedures defined in 2005, based on common targets, national reform programs and 
monitoring (Commission 2010; Council 2010). 
 
 
2. Why should we bother? 
 
There are three main reasons for this unchallenged status of the Strategy on the EU agenda in 
the 2000-2010 period as well as for its future for the 2020 agenda. The first has to do with the 
fact that the Lisbon Strategy has broadened significantly the scope of EU public action for 
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economic growth. With its focus on competitiveness, and on the knowledge-based economy, 
the strategy has expanded the Single Market and has strengthened the economic dimension of 
the EMU, while going beyond them by emphasizing the importance of framework conditions 
for growth. In many senses, the Lisbon Strategy has been an extraordinary process of 
intellectual mobilization across Europe and beyond, traces of which are evident in several 
land-marking reports such as the Kok report and the Sapir report. Much of this intellectual 
mobilization has been related to the shaping of the agenda’s contents and conceptual reach, as 
much as the generation of particular expectations about what is feasible to be delivered. In a 
sense, the competitiveness focus of the agenda has been conceptualized as the raison d’être 
of the EU.  
The second reason why the Lisbon Strategy is so important in the political life 
of the EU is that this widened scope has been put into action in two complementary venues, 
namely by stressing the need of induce a series of widespread reforms at all levels of 
government, including the need to control and reduce red tape and unnecessary regulations; 
and by addressing in an interconnected way a wider set of areas in the unfolding of the efforts 
to improve competitiveness (for example life-long learning, innovation and ICT literacy). 
Last but not least, the third reason why the Lisbon strategy is important in 
European politics is because it has widened considerably the form of EU public action. The 
ambitious agenda for economic growth is being achieved by combining the use of 
conventional EU regulatory and economic instruments, with a series of new policy 
instruments of voluntary nature, stimulating new interactions between public and private 
actors and in a different understanding and set-up for the interaction between the EU-level 
and the member state level. This has been recently enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty. Most of 
the scholarly work on the Lisbon Strategy, however, is based on either the economic outcome 
of individual policies (Archibugi and Coco 2005; Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 2006; van 
Pottelsberghe 2008) or on a specific governance instrument established at the Spring Council 
of March 2000, that is, the open method of coordination. Other studies (Bruno, Jacquot et al. 
2006) have dealt with the Strategy tangentially, moving on from the theoretical premises of 
the Europeanisation framework or in the context of the analysis of the so-called Lisbonisation 
of individual policy areas. 
 
If instead of policies we look at processes or modes of governance, we find yet 
again the tendency to look at only one mode in isolation from the others. Take the case of the 
open method of coordination. Although even to casual observer has noted that EU 
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governance in areas like employment or sustainable development is contingent on the 
interplay between open coordination and hierarchical modes (Armstrong 2005; Borrás and 
Jacobsson 2004; Radulova 2006; Zeitlin 2008), there has been a boom of studies looking at 
the OMC as a self-contained entity, with limited exploration of the inter-connections between 
OMC and other modes of governance in a single policy area. Recently, this literature has 
moved to the consideration of more ambitious analytical frameworks related to 
constitutionalism and governance (Bulmer and Padgett 2005; Armstrong 2008; Sabel and 
Zeitlin 2008). However, these deliberative and learning approaches have to be tested 
alongside other explanations, such as realist politics, neo-functionalism, and ideational 
analysis. 
Likewise, if we look at studies of Europeanization (Radaelli 2003; Exadaktylos 
and Radaelli 2009), they tend to be concerned with the potential of EU public policy for 
domestic change, the different mechanisms at work in complex causal chains, the role of 
learning in bringing about transformations, and the substantive outcomes. However, they do 
not tackle the overall analysis of the Lisbon strategy as such. Finally, institutional analysis of 
EU politics is becoming popular (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000; Marks and Hooghe 2001), 
but this is yet another area where we have not seen projects on the complex institutional and 
multi-level actors constellation at the base of the Lisbon agenda.  
 
To sum up, very little work has been done on the key political questions 
involved in the Lisbon Strategy, like the role of different institutions in the ‘initial framing’ 
and then the re-definition of the main aims through time, the interplay between different 
modes of governance in individual policies and across policies, and the institutional effects 
brought about by the novelties of the Lisbon strategy. Furthermore, we need to approach 
these topics from theoretical considerations, integrating the analysis of the Lisbon Strategy 
within the theoretically-based studies about the EU governance at large. 
The motives for this neglect of the Strategy as a unit of analysis are not clear to 
us. One reason may well be a kind of null hypothesis or conjecture at work, at least 
implicitly, in the minds of political scientists that this time the whole is nothing more than the 
sum of its components. It is an important conjecture and should not be under-estimated in the 
current study. Indeed, we have heard at many academic conferences the claim that the Lisbon 
Strategy is only a discursive veneer on substantive policy domains that have their own history 
and logic. Even so, one has still to explain the reasons behind the amount of discursive, 
administrative and political coordination work in Council formations, the Spring Council, the 
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preparation of three-year cycles of integrated guidelines and lower down in the Commission’s  
annual work programme and the  national plans. This is where the explanatory job begins.  
We therefore propose a conceptual framework for the study of the Lisbon 
Strategy as a case of governance architecture. Employing such a conceptual prism will permit 
to see the architectural dimension of the Lisbon Strategy, examining its nature, its effects and 
its implications for EU politics. Furthermore, understanding that the Lisbon Strategy is a case 
of a general type of object of study (rather than a sui generis – incomparable case), means 
that the specific findings of our analysis could be amenable to preliminary generalizations. 
Future comparative studies with similar cases of governance architectures will provide 
empirically solid answers to broader questions regarding the extent to which these 
governance architectures in Europe and elsewhere are epitomes of the changing nature of 
international and European politics, becoming much more strategic, output-oriented and goal-
seeking in wider political agendas.  
 
3. The Lisbon Strategy as a governance architecture 
 
When defining a new concept in the social sciences, it is paramount to determine the 
analytical context where that concept belongs, its level of abstraction, and the criteria that 
define it vis-à-vis other concepts. The notion of governance architecture draws on 
institutional perspectives in comparative politics, EU studies, and in international relations. 
The basic logic of the governance concept, is that a society needs mechanisms to identify 
some common problems, deciding a set of goals in order to address those problems, and then 
designing and implementing the means to achieve those purposes (Pierre and Peters 2000). In 
the area of international organizations, the governance concept has mostly been associated 
with multi-level governance, referring to processes of problem-identification, goal-setting 
and implementation which are deeply interconnecting different territorial levels, and are 
transforming the traditional form of state-controlled two-level games in the international 
realm (Piattoni 2010). However, taken at face value, multi-level governance is a rather 
abstract concept, with maximal conceptual extension (ample empirical coverage) and 
minimal conceptual intension (it is defined mostly by negation) (Sartori 1970). However 
interesting, multi-level governance is far too abstract to capture analytically the phenomenon 
we are aiming at studying, namely, the more strategic output-oriented type of governance 
activities in the international context. 
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In the introduction of this paper we defined ‘governance architecture’ as a specific form of 
institutional arrangement, characterized by three main features, namely, it addresses complex 
problems in a strategic, holistic long-term perspective; it sets substantive  output-oriented 
goals, and it is implemented through combinations of old and new organizational structures 
within the international organisation in question. Our starting point is an inductive one, as we 
have observed a new set of phenomena within the governance of international organizations 
that do not suit well with pre-existing conceptual definitions. These three analytical criteria of 
‘governance architectures’ cannot be find in other types of governance arrangements of 
multi-level character.  
 
 
Table 1: Levels of governance arrangements within international organizations and their 
features 
 
 
 
Concept Scope of problem 
identification 
Type of goal-setting Implementation 
design 
Multi-level 
governance 
Generic & unchanging 
problems associated to 
core values of the 
international organization 
(i.e. peace, prosperity) 
 
Broad & implicit goals Multi-level 
distribution of 
authoritative decision 
making across 
multiple territorial 
levels 
Governance 
Architecture 
Strategic, holistic, cross-
cutting, long-term 
problem-definition (i.e. 
improving 
competitiveness, job-
creation, reducing poverty) 
Goals and output-
oriented targets in 
different dimensions 
of the strategic 
problem, often time-
limited (i.e. 2000-10)  
Combinations of 
new/old organizational 
arrangements at 
different levels, set up 
for the specific 
fulfilment of the 
strategic goals  
Policy 
program 
Problem definition within 
one single policy area (i.e. 
reform of EUs Common 
agricultural policy) 
Precise goals within 
one single policy area 
Mix of policy 
instruments within the 
same policy area 
 
 
Table 1 locates the concept ‘governance architecture’ as a specific concept in between ‘multi-
level governance’ and ‘policy programs’. This corresponds to the ladder of conceptual 
abstraction defined by Sartori, where ‘multi-level governance’ is the highest level of 
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abstraction (definition by negation), ‘governance architecture’ is the medium-level (definition 
by analysis, i.e per genus et differentiam), and ‘policy program’ is the lowest (contextual 
definition).  
 
'Architecture’ refers to the cognitive as well as in organizational dimensions of these strategic 
decisions, claiming that both dimensions are intrinsically related to each other in the process 
of defining and unfolding international organizations’ public action. Borrowing from a 
framework in contemporary theory of architecture, “the pattern language approach”, timeless 
construction of towns and individual buildings is based in a process of creating and recreating 
a language which is based on certain changing patterns of problem-identification and their 
assigned solutions. Problems and solutions are constantly changing as they are embedded in 
cognitive and organizational parameters which are essentially social and political in nature 
(Alexander, Ishkawa et al. 1977). From our current perspective, the notion ‘architecture’ 
brings other important aspects to the fore, namely, the holistic and the highly political nature 
of new constructs (political or physical). The “language pattern” approach in construction 
theory underlines that construction occurs in a natural and social context, and that new 
buildings seek to bring more coherence and more holistic answers. ‘This is a fundamental 
view of the world. It says that when you build a thing you cannot merely build that thing in 
isolation, but must also repair the world around it, and within it, so that the larger world at 
that one place becomes more coherent, and more whole; and the thing which you make takes 
its place in the web of nature, as you make it’ (Alexander, Ishkawa et al. 1977) p. xiii.  
 
These remarks from architects and urban planners above tell us that the ‘architecture’ notion 
refers to a patterning process which has ideational andlanguage-related as well as 
organisational dimensions. Following this logic, we understand governance architectures to 
be made up of ideational and organisational components.  
 
 
 
The ideational component comprise: 
 
a) A set of fundamental ideational repertoires, expressed in notions such as 
‘governance’, ‘competitiveness’, ‘sustainability’, the ‘knowledge-based society’, and, 
last but not least, the ‘market’. These ideas do not have a clear-cut meaning. They are 
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discursively malleable. They are infused with norms that can be contested, 
changeable, or purposefully created (see Donnelly, this issue). To build a strategy 
around them, political actors have to orchestrate the attribution of meanings and 
create consensus around meanings via coalitional politics. Indeed, the social 
construction of strategy (around these prismatic repertoires) is the essence of 
ideational politics in the EU (Jabko 2006). Ideational repertoires have at least two 
important features. Firstly, they are ‘grand’ and ‘constitutive’ in the sense that they 
make a direct appeal to the core raison d’être of the international/supra-national polity 
in question (in our case, the EU). Secondly, ideational repertoires represent an 
element of novelty in the political agenda. Novelty does not mean necessarily that 
they are created from scratch. They often bring about a novel understanding or re-
interpretation of existing issues, sometimes with different interpretations associated to 
different actors, in the context of a new political thrust of international and supra-
national politics.  
b) A discourse that uses the ideational repertoires in order to discipline, organise and 
legitimise the hierarchical relationships between the goals of a high-profile initiative 
and the policy instruments. With this component we go beyond the simple attribution 
of one meaning or another (or different meanings for different publics). We enter the 
dimension of defining the semantic territory of concepts, the hierarchical organisation 
of ideas and norms, and their relation with the policy instruments used by the policy 
makers. Think of the goal of competitiveness as master-discourse in the Lisbon 
Strategy, or the priority given in the EMU to certain mechanisms for the control of 
inflation (Radaelli 2003). More pertinently perhaps, discourse is a form of social 
interaction that contains both causal ideas and norms that have the effect of 
coordinating and communicating policy choices. The discourse embedded in 
governance architectures contains normative beliefs  about  the institutional 
frameworks that supposedly enhance competitiveness and the most suitable politico-
economic regimes or varieties of capitalism. They contain as well causal beliefs as 
how modes of governance work (and how they affect policy outcomes) and beliefs  
about accountability, transparency, participation and so on (Schmidt 2002).  
 
Taken together, ideas and discourses give shape to the overall attempt to socialise actors 
to a specific frame of reference that is supposed to make sense of a complex world of 
cross-cutting policy problems (a référentiel, Muller, 1995) . Since ideas are malleable and 
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enacted by constellations of actors with different capacity to build coalitions and use 
discourses successfully, there is variation on this component. The ideational component 
of a governance architecture can either socialise actors to a new frame of reference or fail 
to do so. 
 
The organisational components comprise:  
c) Formal and informal organisational arrangements through which overall political 
decisions concerning the architecture are taken. In other words, the explicit politico-
organisational machinery where the ideational repertoires and discourses are in fact 
defined and patterned through complex political processes of multi-level nature. In the 
Lisbon strategy context, this refers to the Spring Council and the other Council 
formations; to the roles of the Commission, European Parliament and the other EU 
institutions; to the corresponding bodies at the national level; and to horizontal 
transnational interactions across borders. In the Single European Market project, this 
organisational arrangements were largely based on the inter-institutional balance of 
powers in the different legislative procedures (particularly co-operation and co-
decision procedures) and distribution and forms of voting powers in the Council 
(qualified majority voting), as defined by the treaty reforms of the Single European 
Act and the Maastricht Treaty. In the case of EMU, these organizational arrangements 
are related to the independent role of the European Central Bank (ECB), and its 
relations to the Eurosystem (formed by the ECB and the central banks of Euro-
countries), as well as to the European System of Central Banks (formed by the ECB 
and central banks of EU Member States inside and outside the Euro). 
 
d) The selection of policy instruments and their procedural requirements is the fourth 
and last organizational component. This has to do with the selection of policy 
instruments among the panoply of possibilities, and with the definition of specific 
procedural requirements as a consequence of this choice. The ideational repertoire 
regarding the nature of ‘governance’ and ideal models of ‘good governance’ is 
articulated organisationally in a set of practical arrangements. The procedural 
requirements are particularly important because they constrain and enable 
organizationally the different governmental levels involved in the political and 
administrative process, which is essentially a multi-level process. In the Single 
European Market, the policy instruments chosen were a series of 300 directives and 
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the creation of European-wide technical standards, both directed towards the creation 
of a single market through de-regulating and re-regulating at EU level. For EMU, the 
instruments chosen have been a set of secondary legislative acts defining the specific 
technical aspects related to monetary policy, and the creation of a Stability Pact and 
the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for coordinated economic and fiscal policies 
of the Euro-members. In the context of the Lisbon Strategy, public action has been 
based on a specific combination of legislation, procedural instruments such as 
systematic consultation and regulatory impact assessment (Radaelli and Meuwese, 
2010) and somewhat decentralized policy instruments (with the OMC and 
benchmarking instruments at the forefront). In consequence the procedural 
requirements have re-defined in important ways some administrative modus operandi, 
at the EU and at the Member State level.  
 
Yet again, there is variation as to how successfully a governance architecture manages its 
organisational components. It may be more or less efficient on this dimension. 
 
Based on these four analytical components, ‘governance architectures’ might show 
interesting degrees and forms of variation according to their ideational and organizational 
features. The table below offers a succinct description of most relevant examples of other 
Governance Architectures in the EU. This analytical framework might allow for a possible 
cross-case comparative exercise about the factors determining their distinct dynamics and 
effects.  
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Table 2: Examples of Governance Architectures in the EU, and their components 
 
 Ideational component Organizational components 
Governance 
Architecture 
Ideational 
repertoire 
Discourse Political & 
organizational 
machinery 
Policy 
instruments 
Lisbon Strategy 
(EU) 
Competitiveness, 
knowledge-based 
economy and 
society 
Welfare state 
reform 
/domestic  
structural 
reforms, 
flexicurity 
reforms 
Spring Council, 
Competitiveness 
Council, 
National Lisbon 
coordinators, 
National 
programming & 
reporting 
Open Method 
of 
Coordination,  
legislation, 
procedural 
instruments  
Single Market 
(EU) 
Economic 
growth, 
liberalization, 
market 
competition 
Economies of 
scale, costs of 
non-Europe, 
efficient 
allocation of 
resources 
Qualified 
Majority Voting 
in the Council, 
mutual 
recognition, 
harmonisation 
techniques 
Directives and 
regulations; 
new approach 
to technical 
standards 
Economic & 
Monetary Union 
(EU) 
Paradigm of 
macro-economic 
stability 
Central bank 
independence 
European 
Central Bank, 
European 
System of 
Central Banks. 
Monetary 
policy 
instruments, 
and 
coordination of 
national 
economic 
policies 
 
 
In a single paper, we cannot generalise about the properties of governance 
architectures, nor undertake a major comparative exercise. However, we introduce two main 
research questions which, although have been elaborated with the Lisbon Strategy in mind, 
have potential for comparative research on governance architectures. The questions are 
portrayed in box 1 below. 
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Box 1- Research Questions 
 
Q1: How did the Lisbon Strategy (ideational and organisational components) emerge? 
Once created, how was it maintained and adapted over time?  
 
Q2: How has the Lisbon Strategy affected patterns of EU and national governance (policy 
effects, institutional effects, administrative effects, and /legal system effects)?  
 
 
 
The first question considers a given governance architecture as a dependent variable, or the 
object to be explained by using a wide range of possible theoretical frameworks. The 
second question looks at the governance architecture as independent variable, tracing its 
effects on several aspects of European governance. 
 
 
4. The emergence and re-definition of the Lisbon Strategy 
 
Our first question is about the emergence of the Lisbon Strategy and then its evolution over 
time. As mentioned, there are several possible pathways to an explanation of Lisbon Strategy 
as a dependent variable according to the myriad of theoretical frameworks in comparative 
politics, EU studies and international relations. Our choice here is to take inspiration from 
institutionalism (historical and discursive) and strategic constructivism, and develop their 
insights within John Kingdon’s theoretical framework on multiple streams (Kingdon 1995). 
At the outset, we note that governance architecture are institutional arrangements. Our 
concept shares with historical institutional approaches (be it rational-choice or sociological, 
see Hall, 2010) the idea that institutions are the product of coalitional politics and power 
relations that play  a role both in abrupt changes and, more often, in slow processes of 
institutional emergence and change. But - this is the second point made by recent institutional 
scholarship - institutions are not un-ambiguous rules that guide action (Mahoney and Thelen 
2010). Institutional ambiguity is refracted among other things by the fact that ideational 
repertoires are not stable over time and may have different meaning for different actors.  
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 If there is ambiguity, there is room for political manipulation. One model that is 
well-suited to connect ambiguity, coalitional politics, and manipulation is the multiple 
streams model (Kingdon 1995). With its emphasis on 'primeval soups' of ideas and gradual 
definition of problems over time, it is also well-suited to make sense of gradual, incremental 
institutional emergence .The theme of long causal sequences reminds us that the Lisbon 
architecture was not created in March 2000 from scratch. Some of its instrumental 
components pre-date the Lisbon summit.  Turning to ideational components, the 
discursive struggle over the notion of competitiveness has a long history, rooted in 
institutional and evolutionary economics as opposed to neo-classical economics. Indeed, one 
can think of the Single Market and Lisbon as two moments in which the EU tried to define its 
own distinctive approach to competitiveness without however settling the ambiguities and 
differences implicit in the persistence of different models of capitalism. Whereas the Single 
European Market focused on economies of scale and unleashing market forces across 
national borders, the Lisbon strategy has paid more attention to institutional framework 
conditions. Besides these general treats, both governance architectures have remained 
relatively normatively undefined as to its preferred model of capitalist organisation. Yet 
different interpretations and emphasis on the principles and ideational repertoires structuring 
the governance architecture might lead to substantial changes though time. Much of the 
ideational and organisational dimensions in the re-definition of the Lisbon strategy in 2005 
and 2010 have dealt precisely about this. Acknowledging the presence of purposeful actors 
with coalitional strategies at work in the process leading to the creation of the Lisbon 
Strategy and in its re-definition over the years, this approach also acknowledges the existence 
of two other crucial factors, namely:  
a) the ambiguity and tensions about policy substance (i.e. the role of the market implicit 
in the Lisbon strategy (Alesina and Perotti 2004)) due to the presence of persisting 
and fundamental disagreements about core notions like ‘competitiveness’ or ‘market 
liberalization’, potentially resulting in some degree of inconsistency and 
incompleteness (van Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil et al. 2008); and  
b) the procedural nature of the governance novelties like the OMC, a manifestation of 
the tendency to defer controversial choices, avoid hard questions of governance2
                                                 
2 Typical here is the discussion around impact assessment, as explained by Radaelli and Meuwese (2010)  
 and 
skirt around  a decision about what Jabko calls ’the ultimate direction of change’ 
(Jabko 2007: 13).  
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The combination of these two factors means that this approach is not confined to a 
perspective uniquely based on preference-seeking agents nor to the simple understanding that 
’ideas matter’ in the sense of deriving choices from a neat, orderly set of ideas. In the Lisbon 
Strategy, and in most other governance architectures, ideas such as ‘competitiveness’ or 
’knowledge-based economy´ have the nature of multi-semantic repertories for action 
described by strategic constructivism (Jabko 2006). In line with the strategic constructivist 
template, the political actors involved in the emergence of the Lisbon Strategy (and its re-
definition over the years) were more engaged in gambling rather than bargaining.  
Once we have established that, we argue that empirical analysis can be informed by the 
multiple streams (MS) approach. Kingdon’s streams relate to problem recognition, the 
formation and refining of policy solutions, and how political parties and governments process 
policy issues and take decisions. MS has been identified with the triad of problems, policy 
solutions, and politics – the three streams originally identified in US public policy and more 
recently applied to the analysis of EU public policy (Zahariadis 2008). When the three 
streams are coupled – a problem is recognised, a solution is available and the political climate 
is propitious – a policy window is opened. In the multiple stream theory, time is not a single 
entity. There are three types of time:  
(a) the time of politics, elections, public opinion movements and campaigning on issues, 
based on the electoral cycle.  
(b) the time of policy ideas and solutions that gradually soften up in communities of 
experts, and are stabilised within coalitions for change or in defence of the status quo; 
and 
(c) the time of policy problems, often characterised by crises and how collective 
problems are portrayed or identified (e.g. through indicators, new analyses and 
focusing events). More broadly, this is the territory of the politics of attention 
(Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). 
Thus, (a) is relatively cyclical – in the EU we have EP elections, Council summits, and the 
renewal of the European Commission at regular intervals of time. Instead, (b) is a much 
slower kind of time, based on different filters (epistemic, but in the EU there is also the 
classic filter of committee governance) through which policy solutions have to go through. 
As for (c), this may be more erratic, with long periods of inertia characterised by abrupt 
change. Multiple Streams provides theoretical leverage to make sense of these different types 
of time. Hence, the multiple stream/ approach enables the researcher to perform process-
tracing in a three-dimensional space (i.e., politics, solutions, and the politics of problem 
17 
 
definition), and to see the role of agency as policy entrepreneurship exploiting specific policy 
windows (Natali 2005). The process of choice that takes place in these short-duration policy 
windows is further affected by the scarcity of attention as policy makers and policy 
communities tend to ration their attention; the density of policy communities determining the 
wider or narrower search of solutions; and the policy entrepreneurs ability to manipulate 
selection process by framing the problem and solutions in narrow perspectives typically 
emotionally-laden (Zahariadis 2007). 
 
This approach needs to link these ideational dynamics to the organizational components of 
governance architectures. To this purpose, Vivien Schmidt suggests that the process of 
softening-up solutions (the so-called shortlist of ideas to be considered by policy-makers) is 
connected to processes of discourse construction – what Vivien Schmidt calls ‘coordinative 
discourse’ (Schmidt 2001), as ideational changes have to be communicated to citizens and 
society in order to gain social legitimacy (Schmidt 2002; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). It is 
this coordinative and communicative dimension that relates to the organizational components 
of the governance architecture, namely, those formalizing and embedding these ideational 
changes into specific organisational changes.  
 
Drawing on the all the theoretical assumptions above, we can formulate two overall 
propositions regarding the emergence, maintenance and change of the Lisbon Strategy. 
Following recent theoretical advances in institutional change, we build a set of propositions 
on the assumption that institutional emergence and change is eminently a gradual process 
base (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Hall 2010). 
 
Firstly, we argue that the creation of the Lisbon Strategy is the product of coalitional politics 
that took advantage of a narrow policy window in the late 1990s. The process of coalitional 
politics and institutional choice that took place in this window of opportunity was defined by 
the opening of political attention to these matters by the Finnish and Portuguese Council 
presidencies (second half of 1999 and first half of year 2000) and by the European 
Commission (putting forward some visions originally aired in the White Paper on 
competitiveness of 1993 (Commission 1993). Hence our first proposition is that the creation 
of the Lisbon Strategy happened at a specific point in time when the problem-stream of 
economic growth and welfare state reform in Europe, was coupled to the eclectic policy 
solutions offered by the rapid influence of institutional and evolutionary economic theory, 
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and to the political stream of a broad left-right wing consensus on the third way. . The 
institutional choice coupling  the three streams (problem, policy and politics) did not only 
have an ideational dimension, but also an organisational one, as the creation of the Lisbon 
Strategy seems to be rooted in the experiences of pre-dating organisational experiences of 
some ‘processes’ in the late 1990s (like the Luxemburg process in employment policy) which 
can be seen as prototypes of what later would be developed and dubbed as the Open Method 
of Coordination. This remark corresponds to the assumptions of historical institutionalism 
that substantial institutional novelties tend to be the outcomes of incremental transformations 
accommodating some pre-existing elements (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). 
 
We add that ideational ambiguity, political manipulation, and uncertainty about institutional 
roles (for example, on who manages and who communicates, (Borrás 2009)) were not settled 
once and for all in Lisbon in March 2000. The unclear division of tasks between the Council 
and the Commission in the first years of the strategy (2000-5) was a source of ambiguity that 
the Commission used to define its role in mainly administrative terms. This changed in the 
2005 re-launch of the strategy, when those tasks became clearer and the Commission 
assumed a broader spectrum of roles. Yet, institutionalisation is never a complete process - 
slack and ambiguity over the interpretation and enactment of the Lisbon rules did not 
evaporate. Compliance - institutional theory suggests - "is inherently complicated by the fact 
that rules can never be precise enough to cover the complexities of all possible real-world 
situations" (Mahoney and Thelen 2010): 11. The second proposition, therefore, has to do with 
the changing nature of this governance architecture after its official creation in 2000. Since 
the ideational or organisational components were not clearly defined at the onset, but were 
deliberately ambiguous, the second proposition  states that changes in the Lisbon Strategy are 
fundamentally  attributed to coalitional processes concerning compliance with the strategy. 
Specifically, coalitional politics around the (re)definition  of ideational and organisational 
arrangements, through discourse coordination and communication involving rational and 
purposeful as well as non-purposeful action by different sets of actors. As the political 
context of this governance architecture was changing through time (from a weak veto 
possibility to strong veto possibility), different coalitions have shaped the institutional 
outcomes given the constantly high level of discretion in the interpretation and enforcement 
of the ideational and organisational arrangements. This means that, following Mahoney and 
Thelen, the gradual changes of the Lisbon Strategy since its creation in year 2000 can be 
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mainly characterized as a form of ‘drift’ and of ‘conversion’3
 
, ultimately determined by 
coalitional processes dominated by different types of actors. 
5. The Effects of Governance Architectures 
Following our second research question, it is worth considering the extent to which the 
Lisbon strategy is likely to have affected the patterns of public policy, particularly at the 
national level. Here we have to be cautious. In a sense, it is up to the papers of this collection 
to shed light on the policy effects. With this caveat, it seems useful to consider the ideational 
and organisation pressures on the domestic systems generated by the Lisbon architecture.  
 
Ideational pressure refers to the difference between policy paradigms contained in the Lisbon 
agenda and the prevailing domestic policy paradigm, both in terms of ideational repertoires 
and political discourses. Explicit in the Lisbon strategy is the intention to generate an 
alignment of national policy objectives with the EU-level overreaching goals. Organisational 
pressure is about the politico-administrative dimension of this pressure, which in our case 
refers to the institutional opportunities offered by the specific forms of political organisation 
and the procedural requirements of policy instruments. We can start from the null hypothesis 
H0 that there have been no ideational or organisational impacts. This may be the case because 
(a) the Lisbon architecture has not created ideational or organisational pressure in spite of its 
ambitious goals, political configurations and policy instruments, or because (b) the ideational 
and/or organisational clash between Lisbon and domestic policy is too extreme to 
accommodate change, hence Lisbon has been ideologically and politico-administratively 
‘resisted’ at the level of member states.  
 
A set of hypothesis H1-4 can be drawn by the literature on Europeanization and compliance 
with EU rules. One classic proposition in this field is that, given pressure on national system 
arising out of EU commitments, the impact at the national level is largely associated to the 
presence of national-specific institutional variables that define the intermediate level of 
pressure (Börzel and Risse 2003). Degree and forms of national impact can be predicted on 
the basis of these nationally-specific intervening variables. Given non-extreme degrees of 
Lisbon-generated pressure (a precondition for Europeanization to occur), domestic change 
depends on the following intervening variables: 
                                                 
3 “Drift: The changed impact of existing rules due to shifts in the environment; Conversion: the changed 
enactement of existing rules due to their strategic redeployment” Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 16. 
20 
 
1) The degree of discretion in the implementation of Lisbon goals. This is a crucial 
intervening factor at the national level. Earlier we have referred to the relative open-
ended nature of the Lisbon strategy both in terms of the definition of meta-goals 
following a set of ideational repertoires (‘competitiveness’) and in terms of the 
cyclical and changing contents of the Lisbon strategy itself. We assume that this 
relatively open-ended nature has in principle allowed to accommodate better these 
overall goals and principles within different traditional national policy goals 
according to different interpretations of ideational repertoires. However, across 
Lisbon policy areas, the stringency and clarity of prescriptions set at the EU level 
vary, and so do the expected levels of learning ‘from the top’ down to the national and 
local level. This leads us to the following hypothesis, namely, (H1) the more open the 
Lisbon strategy goals are, the greater the possibility to accommodate and make 
compatible the pre-existing national goals with EU-goals, inducing domestic change 
gradually. 
2) The communication and coordination of the discourse at national level (Schmidt 
2002). This refers to who has entry and voice in the Lisbon-related articulation of the 
national discourse that motivates change, as well as the associated dynamics of 
communication and coordination. For example, the Lisbon debate on innovation may 
have suddenly empowered the voice of evolutionary economists, since they seem to 
have more to say about innovation than traditional economists, a cornerstone of the 
‘competitiveness’ notion.4
3) The national traditions of political and administration organisation. This 
intermediate variable refers to the overall principles and structures defining the 
politico-administrative organisation at the national level. The Lisbon strategy political 
 The distinction between coordinative and communicative 
discourse is useful here, leading our way to the following hypothesis. (H2) For reform 
coalitions, policy entrepreneurs and politico-administrative organisational leaders 
pushing for changes to bring policy in line with the Lisbon templates, a thin 
coordinative discourse facilitates the adoption of new policy ideas or organisational 
platforms. As explained by Vivien Schmidt, thin coordinative discourse implies thick 
communicative discourse meaning that a large number of actors are involved in the 
construction of a discourse that convinces public opinion that the change is legitimate 
and serves the interests of the country. 
                                                 
4 We are grateful to Jakob Edler for this comment. 
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organisation is based on a specific constellation of formal and informal arrangements 
(Spring Council, Competitiveness Council, etc) likely to influence the political 
organization at the national level. Likewise, the Lisbon strategy is largely inspired by 
new public management organizational forms, which contrast with the Napoleonic or 
Weberian type of political-administration traditions of state-society relations. The 
politico-administrative organisation at the national level is highly embedded in a 
specific historical context, and therefore it tends to change gradually and following 
strong path dependencies. For that reason the hypothesis here is that (H3) the more 
similar the pre-existing forms of national organisational structures are to the political 
and administrative organizational structures and principles of the Lisbon strategy, the 
more likely domestic change will be the product of a synergy between the Lisbon-
induced change and the country’s own drive for change. Yet, the absence of this 
structural similarity would invariably mean a more problematic domestic change 
because it implies a more radical/disruptive pressure for change, challenging 
historical path dependencies. 
4) The presence-absence of institutional opportunities for coupling and 
entrepreneurship. Institutions enable or constrain policy entrepreneurs. In 
consequence, the amount of change depends on the institutional position of the reform 
coalition or policy entrepreneur (inside or outside the core executive; see Chiattelli 
2008). This is related to the degree of empowerment of core executive authority at 
national level in terms of the relationship between Prime Ministers’ offices and 
sectoral ministries, the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians, the 
relationship between executives and parliaments, and the openness to external 
advisors and experts. The seventh and last hypothesis is therefore related to the 
literature dealing with the Europeanization of national political systems (Goetz and 
Meyer-Sahling 2008) which examines the role of national political systems’ 
organizational features as variables explaining diversity in the degree and forms of the 
EU’s national impact. Hence our hypothesis reads that (H4) the institutional position 
of the entrepreneur (individual or reform coalition) within those national 
organisational structures determines the amount of change at the domestic level that is 
related to the Lisbon Strategy ideational and organisational features. 
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7. Final Remarks  
 
During the past few decades the literature of EU studies has focused overwhelmingly on 
treaty reforms and their associated socio-legal dynamics. Other sets of studies have also 
provided single policy change perspectives, focusing on the day-to-day EU politics. To a 
large extent the intellectual agenda focusing on these two (the legal and constitutional 
dimension of EU integration and the day-to-day individual policy change) has tended to 
disregard important political aspects of EU integration beyond issues of delegation and 
legal constitutionalization, and beyond specific policy dynamics. We suggest that 
governance architectures are another focal point in the study of international politics and 
regional integration, as these objects of study reflect new ways of doing politics in the 
international context.  
 
This analytical perspective differs, but complements, the Treaty and the day-to-day based 
views on what is the relevant concrete object of study as a proxy of the dependent variable 
which is ultimately the integration and governance process in the EU. Governance 
architectures can be seen as long-term ambitious political initiatives articulating specific 
sets of public action that address a core goal of the European project.  
 
They also have a constitutional dimension, not only in the strict terms of the enshrinement 
of legal means in the Treaties, but essentially in terms of their far-reaching political ideals 
which become concretely articulated in policy and in organizational terms. This is the 
reason why, when studying these governance architectures, scholars of EU integration 
should not only look at the means (legal or otherwise) but also at the overall political and 
structural nature of such long-term strategies. 
 
Governance architectures mobilize actors and create the conditions for engagement in 
different policies. The EU succeeds in mobilizing and in attracting political attention 
mostly  in relation to grandiose, long-terms projects. However, over time these governance 
architectures seem to have become less specific: the single market was eminently a project 
linked to a large bundle of directives and the principle of mutual recognition. In 
comparison, Economic and Monetary Union was more open-ended in terms of 
membership and final point of arrival, but concretely it meant a single currently for those 
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willing and able to join. It was and remains vague on moral hazard and other post-
implementation problems. The Lisbon Strategy has not settled the ambiguities and 
contested dimensions of the competitiveness project. The end-point (the most competitive, 
sustainable, socially inclusive knowledge-based society) is either perceived in different 
ways by key member states and remains in any case difficult to achieve given the current 
performance of the European economies and societies. The ideational components of 
governance architectures do not invariably achieve their official goals, but just like Pierre 
Muller (1995) noted in his référentiels, 
 
they might serve other functions, especially the 
function of creating consensus around the cognitive and organisational aspects of public 
policy. The Lisbon Strategy has been an attempt to socialize a large number of players to 
new paradigms of public policy and to engage them in new forms of organizational 
procedures. Today, it is still an incomplete process since competitiveness remains a 
challenge for the European economy and society. The current economic and financial 
upheavals may create the shock for a re-alignment of cognitive beliefs and policy norms, 
or may trigger more divergence than before. This is the terrain on which Europe 2020 
represents a key opportunity for the EU and its Member States. 
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